


ALLENDE'S CHILE:

1000 bungled DAYS

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by Patrick J. Ryan

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SALVADOR ALLENDE
"The architect of genocide for his own political organization."



Allende who hypocritically protested against civil war is shown in this photograph found after the occupation of his private villa —Tomás Moro— firing a Soviet-made automatic weapon.



MILITARY JUNTA OF CHILE

Members of Chile's Military Junta from left to right are: General César Mendoza, Admiral José T. Merino, General Augusto Pinochet, General Gustavo Leigh.

ALLENDE'S CHILE:
1000 BUNGLED DAYS

For ten years the United States fought communism in Vietnam, 7000 miles from California, at a tragic loss of 55,000 American lives, six times as many wounded, not to mention a staggering cost of 150 billion dollars. The Vietnam debacle, authored and orchestrated by a decade of politicians in Washington to the ludicrous battle cry of "measured response" strained our national unity as no other event in our history since the Civil War. What did we accomplish at this horrendous price? We lost the war! On the other-hand, the Republic of Chile, situated in our hemisphere, fought communism here in America's backyard without the aid of B-52's, the 7th Fleet, or even a Bob Hope visit. No American fingers squeezed M-16 triggers, no gruesome parade of American flag draped caskets were airlifted daily from Santiago, Chile, to gravesites in the United States of America. What's more, without our aid, and unencumbered by our tactic of "measured response" the Chileans defeated communism! The United States' government not only has not acclaimed Chile's outright defeat of communism, but incredibly, our Senate and Congress, via the Kennedy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, have terminated all military aid to the new anti-communist government of Chile. Why?

The foregoing "why" is not only difficult to answer in itself, but it also begets other interesting rhetorical questions. For example, is this a logical position for the United States to take against the most pro-U.S. country in South America? Does not Cuba's activity in Angola clearly indicate that the communists will still export violence to any hemisphere when and where it serves their purpose? If Cuba permanently assumes the role of Russia's hired gun, where will she strike next? Has our government, particularly our legislators and State Department, become so mesmerized by detente, that we can sell critically needed wheat to communist Russia while at the same time contemplating curtailing all forms of economic transactions with anti-communist Chile? Is it possible, that we have met the enemy and they are us?

Rhetorical questions aside, the "why" of our legislative branch's punitive attitude toward anti-communist Chile is difficult to rationalize, because it is diametrically opposed to all our foreign policy statements, objectives and actions of the past three decades. The policy mutation is so drastic, so unexpected, that it leaves one temporarily shocked and inarticulate. More subtle, logical shifts in our foreign policy and relationships are easier to comprehend and, consequently, to rationalize. For example, our new requirement for a more guarded posture with the countries that comprise the underbelly of NATO makes good common sense. There currently exists in those countries strong political elements i.e., communists and socialist groups whose allegiance to NATO and its goals is dubious at best. Obviously then, we must proceed with a new caution, lest we provide a direct conduit for all our military secrets to Moscow, or worse, arm a future enemy. But, how does one rationalize after the United States active participation in the decade of Cold War, the Korean War, the Bay of Pigs, the economic isolation of Cuba and ten agonizing years in Vietnam fighting communism - - that suddenly - - anti-communism is no longer worthy of our support? Perhaps in the political labyrinth of our Congressional halls, or on the pages of our American newspapers, this course of action can be rationalized. But here, on ground zero in Chile, it cannot!

Our legislators' punitive attitude toward Chile seems predicated primarily on two rationales. First, that the legally elected Allende government was deposed on 11 September 1973, by a military coup d' etat covertly aided and/or directed by the Central Intelligence Agency and the U. S. military. Therefore, since the United States was instrumental in creating the Chilean military regime, we are responsible, at least indirectly, for its

conduct. Secondly, that human rights in Chile are being abused to such an extent that the full power of the foreign policy and the laws of the United States must be brought to bear to correct the alleged injustices. The first rationale, that the United States instigated the coup is incorrect. The second rationale, though with some altruistic merit, is unrealistic and so selective in its morality as to be absurd.

FIRST RATIONALE: U. S. COVERTLY INSTIGATED COUP

Much has been written about the Chilean coup d' etat of 11 September 1973, that terminated what has become popularily known as the "Chilean Marxist Experiment." Much of what have been written is so far from the truth and reality, as to make one question the competence and/or the ethics of various correspondents and authors. In retrospect, obviously some of the field correspondents, especially the "stringers", were journalistic prostitues who could find something scandalous, sexy or sinister about a Girl Scout Jamboree in order to peddle their stories. Other authors rushed to print before the story cooled and expediently sacrificed accuracy for speed. Still others grossly exaggerated and/or blatantly fabricated facts to suit their preconceived opinions of events. Specific examples of each type of such reporting will be noted later in this article. With this type of reporting and analysis of the rise and fall of the Allende regime, it is small wonder that the world is generally misinformed about the sequence of events that inexorably swept Chile's Junta Militar to power.

Salvador Allende, after receiving only 36.2% of the popular vote in a three-way presidential race during September 1970, was ratified as Chile's president by the congress after he accepted a "Statute of Guarantees" as an amendment to the Constitution.[2] Subsequent his election, Allende told French journalist Regis Debray: "I signed the amendment as a simple tactical necessity to gain power."[3]

Allende's Presidency precipitated violence even before he was sworn into office, when the Army Chief of Staff, General Rene Schneider, was murdered in October 1970, during a bungled kidnap attempt by members of the Ultra Right Wing Patria y Libertad. In many ways, emulating the perpetrators of this ominous crime, Allende bungled and stumbled his way through 1000 days as Chile's president. With few exceptions, Salvador Allende's days in office were ultimately a daily disaster for all Chileans, except for the Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionaria, MIR (Movement of Revolutionary Left) who were using the time to prepare for a violent revolution within the ostensibly peaceful revolution won via the ballot in 1970. Apparently, with either malice aforethought, or culpable negligence of catostrophic proportions, Allende excited and agitated extremists of both sides, precipitated divisive controversy and actively encouraged violence. Allende's performance as president was so inept, so crass, that historians will almost certainly label him as the architect of genocide for his own political organization. If Allende was the creator of the Chilean Marxist Experiment he also was without doubt its executioner. The record speaks for itself for those who are willing to listen.

DIAGRAM FOR FAILURE

Allende's ultimate downfall was the direct result of gross economic mismanagement, intentional violation of Chile's laws and constitution, government sanctioned terrorism and wanton exacerbation of political tensions to the point of near civil war. No foreign government, specifically not the United States, played a significant role in the failure of the Chilean Marxist Experiment. The passive withholding of relatively minor amounts of aid/credit by the United States can at best be considered a minor inconvenience and could easily have been offset by the

Soviets, had they considered Allende's regime a good risk. They did not. They were right![4]

The more flagrant examples of policies, events, decisions and actions that swept Salvador Allende from the euphoria of his election as Chile's president to his ignominious death in the Presidential Palace can generally be grouped under the headings, "Economic Factors and Illegal and Unconstitutional Actions."

ECONOMIC FACTORS

By dawn's early light on 12 September 1973, the day after the coup, the only bright light in Chile's economic situation to greet the Junta Militar was the fact that: Allende would be one helluva easy act to follow! Otherwise, measured by anyone's economic standards, Chile had hit bottom. Described another way, David Holden, chief foreign correspondent of the London Times had this comment on Allende's economic policies: "Unfortunately, nobody with even a nodding acquaintance with economics could have classified the management of the Allende government as anything but disastrous."[5]

Admittedly, statistics, like a bikini, are often more interesting for what they conceal, rather than what they reveal. However, a few, like the Won-Lost column in the National Footbal League are reasonably accurate barometers of any type endeavor; athletic, or economic. For example, upon its October 1970 stand down, the Frei Government turned over an excess of US $343 million in international reserves to the Allende Government. Less than three years later in September 1973, Chile had a deficit of more than US $300 million, or a net loss of approximately US $650 million. The Allende government's officially acknowledged rate of inflation for 1973 was 508%. Independent economists pegged the figure closer to 700% - either way, one of the highest inflation rates in the economic history of the world. The Marxist President solved these economic problems by printing 670% more Chilean money in 1971 and 1972 than existed in 1970. Some called it "Monopoly Money!" Other statistics are equally indicative of an economy speeding to a crash: consumer price index up 842% between 1970-1973, wheat production down 45%, corn down 25%, copper production (which comprises 80% of Chile's vital export assets) down 25%, the Central Bank of Chile left with only US $3 million cash assets on 1 September 1973.[6]

The foregoing statistics reflect, of course, only the net effects of Allende's economic policies and may be interpreted and analyzed contingent upon one's personal point of view. However, the basic cause of the gloomy statistics leave little room for debate in any objective forum. Some of the causes of the reverses are identified as follows:

1. Allende Government assuming control of all Chile's banks and, ipso facto, all loans, savings, fluid financial assets and major business transactions. Enter government control of all banking, exit free enterprise in any form!

2. Massive government spending, financed by printed Monopoly Money. To further exacerbate matters, the primary beneficiaries of this spending were Allende's lower economic strata political base, who, you must remember comprised at best only 1/3 of Chile's population. To say, that the remaining 2/3 of Chile's population were unhappy with these programs would be a classic understatement.

3. Large wage increases, without concurrent production increases. Once again, primarily wage increases benefiting Allende's political base.

4. Government policies, especially "intervention," (Spanish language euphemism for "stealing") of private enterprise causing not only Chilean private captial, but of equal importance, talented Chilean businessmen to flee Chile for safe havens abroad.

5. Prior to 29 June 1973, the government "intervened" 282 large industries, which produced in excess of 50% of Chile's industrial output. (The date 29 June is significant for reasons which will become obvious later).

6. The Allende government "intervened" and redistributed approximately 5,800 farms under its Agrarian Reform Program. Although approximately 50% of these farms were "legally intervened" under the agrarian reform program originally instigated by former President Eduardo Frei, an equal number were redistributed at gun point by MIR vigilantes operating with at least the tacit tolerance, if not the active cooperation, of the Allende government.[7] By mid 1973, 40% of the arable land in Chile had been "intervened" and redistributed.[8] The net result of this great agrarian leap forward was an overall reduction of 22% in agricultural output.[9] By mid 1973, Chile was plagued with a food shortage so severe that persons not able to deal on the rampant and expensive black market stood in lines three hours or more to buy a rationed amount of basic necessities. Chileans, even Allende supporters, were fast becoming very tired of waiting in food lines to buy one chicken for a family of five. Chileans, even supporters of Allende, were also becoming very tired of the Chilean Marxist Experiment!

7. Bureaucratic incompentence and inefficiency in operating the "intervened" banks, businesses and farms. Particularly worthy of note here, is the fact that staffs and work forces of the "intervened" banks and businesses were subsequently featherbedded at a rate of 100%, with of course "politically qualified personnel."

8. Loss of foreign aid and private investment, primarily from the United States, occasioned by the expropriation of United States privately owned assets without compensation. Although it is generally acknowledged that the Russians partially financed Allende's election efforts by the equivalent of about US $20 million, the Soviets, also appalled by Allende's fiscal policies decided not to assume another Cuban-type dependent in this hemisphere. The only known foreign support the Allende government received from Russia was a conservative 12 year credit in rubles for Chilean import of Russian industrial goods in exchange for a limited amount of Chilean copper over a two year period.[10]

ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTIONS

Salvador Allende, on his third try, gained the Presidency of Chile in a legal and constitutional manner. Unfortunately for Chileans, his subsequent actions as President were frequently contra the intent of the law and spirit of the consititution, and on some occasions were blatantly illegal and unconstitutional.

The fact that President Allende administered the government of Chile in an illegal and unconstitutional manner is not the hindsight opinion of this author, but rather were the real time assessments of the judicial and legislative branches of the Chilean government during the crucial days of mid-73 as the Allende regime dropped all pretense of legality and constitutionality:

1. 26 May 1973: A unanimous Supreme Court resolution denounced the Allende regime's "disruption of the legality of the nation" by its failure to uphold a criminal court's decision to evict persons from illegally "intervened" private property.

2. 26 June 1973: A second Supreme Court resolution addressed to President Allende, charging him with illegal and unconstitutional interference in legal affairs that fall "within the exclusive competence of the Judicial Power."

3. 8 July 1973: A joint declaration by Eduardo Frei, President of the Senate, and Luis Pareto, President of the Chamber of Deputies, appealed to Allende for the reestablishment of legality "before it is too late." The declaration emphasized the danger of civil war inherent in the regime's policy of arming illegal groups and the "creation of a parallel army in which numerous foreigners are collaborating."

4. 8 August 1973: A declaration of the General Council of the Bar Association which warned the public of the "the collapse of the rule of law" in Chile, and said the "obvious fracturing of our legal structure can no longer be tolerated." It called for the reestablishment of rights for all citizens and of "full independence of the Judiciary Branch."

5. 22 August 1973: A declaration by the Chamber of Deputies (elected in March 1973) presented a bill of particulars charging President Allende's regime with deliberate pattern of illegal and unconstitutional behaviour and widespread violation of FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS. (Captialization is author's).

6. 31 August 1973: The General Council of the Bar Association issued a report on the growing jurisdictional conflict between the President and the Congress, concluding that only congress was competent to legislate and determine the extent of Presidential authority.

Although all these aforementioned citations addressed serious violations of Chile's laws and constitution, the violations noted by the first and third citations were most visible, emotional and explosive. These particular violations of Chilean laws and constitution, more than any others, carried the country to the brink of civil war by September 1973.

ILLEGAL INTERVENTIONS: Citation 1

Putting aside the 50% of farms that were "legally" intervened, consider a typical scenario at a farm that was illegally intervened. Members of the MIR arrive at the farm where you and your forefathers have worked for perhaps three generations. You were born there in your mother's bedroom; your grandparents are buried there. Your family isn't rich by world standards, but they are comfortable and have earned their comfort by generations of investment and hard work. The workers on your farm are subsidized, have a personal plot of land and are considered quasi-members of the family.

The leader of the MIR group, a 25 year old thug, backed up by his gang and a Russian AK-47 sub machine gun says, "You don't live here anymore and you have 24 hours to pack your personal things and leave." Do you call the police? No, they have been instructed not to interfere. Can you apply for redress to the courts? No, previous favorable criminal court decisions in this regard were overridden by the government. What can you do? You can leave your farm before you are shot! An impossible scenario? No, it happened

that way, in some form or other, over 2000 times during the Allende regime.[11] The highest authority in the land, the President, not only approved of these strong arm methods, he vigorously supported them. Consider this incredible statement of Allende's quoted by Gary MacEoin, an author who obviously was sympathetic to Allende and the Chilean Marxist Experiment: "The peasants have been degraded, humiliated and destroyed for generations and they are hungry. We cannot expect them to wait until the law expropriates land that was stolen from them decades ago. Men who are hungry do not wait to reason. If the landowners attempt violence they are going to be confronted with the violence that the President of the Republic can unleash against them."[12]

Allende voiced other bellicose public statements. When questioned about his grandiose campaign promise of one quart of milk per day for every Chilean child, he replied: "When we run out of four legged beasts, we will milk the two legged beasts." Or, prior his ratification by Congress: "Santiago will be painted red with blood if I am not ratified as President." Strident though they be, the latter two examples pale in comparison with Allende's stated policy of governmental violence against legal landowners.

ARMED ILLEGAL GROUPS: Citation 2

The Allende government clandestinely stockpiled enough small arms, rifles, machine guns, rockets/mortars and the like to equip a U.S. Marine Corps Division.[13] An exaggerated comparison to gain your attention? No, the truth. Irrefutable evidence, not in the form of junta statements or pictures that could be doctored, but rather in the form of some 15,000 actual weapons recovered from Allende's ultra left supporters since 11 September 1973. Allende had become so incredibly Machiavellian, that the primary center in Chile for instruction in use of these arms was El Canaveral, Allende's presidential retreat in the Andean foothills. The instructors at this training center for terrorism were Cubans. Their macabre mission was to train Chileans to combat Chileans. It is any wonder that the President of the Chilean Congress condemned the existence of such terrorist groups? Is it any wonder that the armed forces ultimately decided that a president who actively supported such terrorist groups was totally unfit to be President?

The terrorist army that would execute the violent revolution was recruited from the ranks of the 12,000 to 14,000 foreigners who gravitated like lemmings to Chile during the Allende years and from the ultra left factions of the Allende regime. The day to day personal expenses of this phantom army were subsidized by featherbedding them on the roles of the "intervened" industries controlled by the government. Their terrorist activities were subsidized by siphoning money from the income of the same industries.[14]

The key leaders of this phantom army were not Chileans who felt any allegiance to Chile, but rather were primarily Cubans whose only fidelity was to world Marxism.

Typifying this latter group was Luis Fernandez Ona, alias "Gatillo Facil," ("Easy Trigger") a nickname he earned as an assassin in Cuba. Gatillo Facil was directly responsible for training Allende's personal bodyguards, the infamous Grupos de Amigos Personales, GAP (Group of Friends of the President) at El Canaveral. Subsequent to his marriage to Allende's daughter, Gatillo Facil became one of Allende's key advisors and was assigned an executive position in the Presidential Palace. The mere presence of Gatillo Facil and his hired guns in the Moneda was considered a

cancer in the heart of their government by Chilean constitutionalists and a gross insult by the established security forces, i.e., the Chilean armed forces.[15]

With the aforementioned economic blunders and legal/constitutional violations as a genesis, Chile, by June 1973, had become a revolution looking for a place to happen. Even to sideline observers, it was not a question of would Allende's regime fall, but rather when. On 27 June 1973, the countdown to "when" began with a bizarreness in keeping with the Allende years - a woman stuck her tongue out at a general! A Chilean housewife passing General Carlos Prats Gonzales in an auto stuck her tongue out at him. At the time, Prats was the senior officer in the armed forces, the Army Chief, a member of Allende's Cabinet, and to the frequent chagrin of his contemporaries, a ardent supporter of Allende's brand of government. In midday traffic, Prats gave chase to the offending matron, firing two shots at her car in the process. When he finally captured her, Chile's Army Chief before 500 or more incredulous street-side witnesses, placed his pistol to the head of the defenseless woman and commanded: "Pide perdon, mierda, o te mato" ("apoligize you shit, or I'll kill you"). Prats barely escaped with his life from the scene as the aroused witnesses to the disgusting performance spontaneously rushed to the woman's aid. Any vestige of respect Prats had left in the Chilean military and consequently any restraining influence he could bring to bear on his contemporaries vanished instantly.

Not to be outdone by their Chief, the Army's Second Armored Regiment two days later on 29 June launched a disorganized comedy-tragedy type attack on the Presidential palace. The comic aspect of the attack was the tanks stopping at all red lights enroute to the Moneda and/or running out of gas in front of the palace. The tragic aspect was, that although the abortive attack was quickly subdued by the Chilean military, Allende used it as an excuse to rally his supporters to more illegal actions. Taking to the radio, actually after the ineffectual attack had been essentially suppressed, Allende urged his supporters to "take over all the industries and enterprises as a response to the uprising of a small group of the rebellious military." Immediately, 244 more factories were "intervened," this time by well armed workers responding to the personal call to arms of the President of Chile. Allende saw this proliferation of armed strong holds among the people as insurance against any future coup.[16] The still loyal, but increasingly uneasy armed forces saw the same action as anarchistic and the tinder box for civil war.

July witnessed the intensification of all aspects of the impending disaster. Food supplies grew shorter and lines to purchase same grew longer. Cabinet ministers joined and departed the government as though Moneda had revolving doors. The black market flourished and the international value of the Chilean escudo to the US dollar skyrocketed from E° 960 to E° 2000. Rumors originated from Talcahuano that the MIR had infiltrated the ranks of the Chilean Navy. Without doubt the single most damaging stroke during July was the reinstigation of the transportation workers' strike, this time supported by most other unions and professional associations in Chile. The transportation strike, which lasted from 26 July until the coup literally brought Chile to a stand still. What little food there was available could not get to market. Gasoline stations had no gas for private cars. Medical and dental treatment was available only on an emergency basis. Buses were not available to take Chile's

children to school, which was essentially a moot question as most teachers were on strike. Electric and telephone service was sporadic at best because workers could not (or would not) travel to their positions. Garbage collection ceased, as did most other municipal services. So went the sad litany of events in the dying days of the Chilean Marxist Experiment.

August was more of July, only worse as the noose of the transportation strike squeezed tighter. Rumors of MIR infiltration of the Navy became reality with the 7 August arrest of small cells of enlisted sailors on board the cruiser Latorre and destroyer Blanco in Valparaiso. The Navy announced that its investigation revealed a conspiracy to mutiny and murder, which incredibly included Allende's congressional leaders Carlos Altamirano and Oscar Garreton. The Navy requested that the congressmen's parliamentry immunity be waived to permit their trial. Allende took the request under consideration. On 9 August, Allende in a last gasp effort to gain respectability and trust for his failing government formed a cabinet which included all three military chiefs. By 24 August, all three military chiefs had resigned and exited via the now well-traveled revolving door; presumably an international record for formation and termination of a cabinet. General Prats, stumbling from disaster to disaster like his leader Allende, finally received the ultimate rebuke to his "latino machismo." Three hundred of his army officers' wives gathered outside Prats's home on 22 August and demanded his resignation. Prats, ever the diplomat, ordered, or at least permitted, their dispersal with tear gas and water hoses. Prats wisely resigned as Army chief and from Allende's Cabinet on 23 August. Meanwhile, subsequent to Admiral Raul Montero's entry in to Allende's Cabinet on 9 August despite the mutiny revelations, the Navy took the position that Admiral Montero had lost all credibility as its leader and pressed hard for his replacement as Navy chief by Admiral Jose Toribio Merino. Montero finally resigned from the Cabinet on 24 August and also wanted to resign as Navy chief. However, Allende, preferring to deal with the malleable Montero instead of the hardline Merino, elected not to relieve the former as Navy chief.[17]

September marked the beginning of the end for the Allende regime. Increasingly concerned with internal naval security, the Navy continued to press for the appointment of Merino as Navy chief, seeing in him their, and perhaps Chile's, only salvation. Finally on 3 September, Admirals Merino and Sergio Huidobro were able to gain a conference with Defense Minister Orlando Letelier and President Allende. After much heated debate, Allende agreed to appoint Merino as Navy chief on 7 September. This information was relayed to all naval officers, and although they were sympathetic to the beleaguered Montero, they awaited the change with enthusiasm and new hope. The change did not come. Merino went to the Presidential Palace on 7 September to accept appointment as Navy Chief, only to find that Allende had reneged on his promise of 3 September. Merino returned to Valparaiso embarrassed and empty handed.[18] Unfortunately for Allende, it was a mistake he would <u>not</u> live to regret!

Shocked by Allende's broken promise, senior naval officers conferred the entire day and night of 8 September in Valparaiso. The situation was extremely tense. Their backs were to the wall and they were desperate. The rumors about the MIR infiltration of the Navy had become fact. Now, what about the infamous Plan ZETA?[19] Was it rumor or fact? Could they risk the former, or should the assume the latter? Chile was without food. No child has been to school in two months. The economy was bankrupt. The country's armed, divisive factions were a hair trigger squeeze away from bloody civil war. Reluctantly, but with the certain knowledge that there was no other

choice, Admiral Merino gave the order to execute Operation COCHAYUYO (Seaweed). As if to lend support to their momentous decision, Senator Altamirano that same day publicly acknowledged that he indeed had conspired to instigate mutiny in the Navy and that further, he would continue such acts.[20] On Sunday, 9 September, Marine Commandant Admiral Huidobro and his Chief of Staff Ariel Gonzales carried the brief message, signed by Merino, to Santiago for the concurrence of the army and air force. The message said simply: "D-day is Tuesday. The hour is 0600. Jose Toribio." Generals Augosto Pinochet and Gustavo Leigh received the message for the Army and Air Force respectively. They wrote "conforme" (concur) on the message, signed their names, and in so doing altered Chile's destiny.[21]

It is not the intent of this article to offer a blow by blow account of the historic events of 11 September 1973, that finally terminated what had now become the Chilean Marxsist Tragedy. Those details have been thoroughly, albeit not very accurately reported to the world. The Chilean military assumed control of Valparaiso and Talcahuano, Chile's second and third largest cities without a shot being fired. Unfortunately there was violence in Santiago. However, the bloodshed there was not the result of a vengeful attack by the military, but rather the maniacal resistance offered by the GAP from their well protected positions behind the wall of the fortress like Moneda. For the GAP there was no tomorrow, and despite the very obvious fait accompli, they fought accordingly. The Moneda was surrounded by the armed forces at 0830. From inside the Moneda Allende personally broadcasted two "Mayday" type messages. The first, at 0830, sounded strong and confident as he summoned his supporters to the Moneda to defend their country against the military. This time his call to arms went unanswered. The second, at 0930, sounded morose, almost as if he were preparing the eulogy for his dying government. Despite repeated offers to surrender, which included safe passage to any South American country for Allende and his family, the Marxist president elected to fight to the end. It was not until high noon in Santiago, three and a half hours after the Moneda was surrounded, that the air force was finally ordered to rocket the Moneda. The GAP defenses crumbled under the pinpoint rocket attacks. At 1330, the GAP and other Allende supporters in the Moneda were allowed to surrender. At approximately 1345, President Salvador Allende committed suicide. A gold metal plate imbedded in the stock of his suicide weapon was inscribed with the words: "To my good friend Salvador Allende. Fidel Castro." Obviously, Castro's Cuba had sent one too many guns to Chile for Allende's own good.[22]

The coup d' etat that terminated the Allende regime has probably received more world-wide media coverage than any similar event in history. Chile's Junta Militar alleges that much of the unfavorable reporting was and is communist inspired. Detractors of the Junta accuse them of paranoia, of seeing world communism behind every adversity and maintain that the reporting is objective. Are the Chileans paranoid? Is the reporting objective? Even allowing for legitimate errors of fact and analysis, the new government of Chile seems to have a case.[23]

In the days following 11 September 1973, headlines from around the world universally denounced the overthrow of the Allende regime. The obvious fact that Allende's demise was inevitable, given the chaos of Chile was generally ignored. Condemnation of Allende's overthrow from the communist bloc nations was of course to be expected, but consider these headlines from England, which were typical of the free world's

reaction. The Guardian (12/9/73) headlined "REVOLT AGAINST THE BALLOT BOX" and castigated Chile's armed forces. The New Statesman (14/9/73) headlined "DISASTER IN CHILE" and observed that the cause of socialism and democracy had been set back for all the world. The Statesman again, (16/9/73) headlined "THE DEATH OF HOPE" and even compared the Allende overthrow with the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia. Where were the headlines that might more accurately have read, "CHILE REVOLTS AGAINST MARXIST TYRANNY", "CHILE AVERTS DISASTER", or "THE BIRTH OF HOPE IN CHILE?" Where were the headlines and editorials reporting that Chile's junta, rather that seeking power, had it thrust upon them by a government intent upon genocide? Where were the balanced views and the objective analysis?

Of personal interest to the author was a London Times article (27/10/73) written by Godfrey Hodgson and William Shawcross, which stated that, "in planning for the coup d' etat, Admiral Jose Toribio Merino maintained close personal liaison with Lieutenant Colonel Patrick J. Ryan, USMC of the U.S. Navy Mission in Valparaiso, Chile". Although I found the London Times reporting of my daily and personal liaison with Admiral Merino most flattering, I also found it completely untrue! During the eight months in Chile preceding the coup, my desk calendar reveals only two appointments with Admiral Merino, and they dealt with strictly mundane matters. These appoinments were typical vice admiral - lieutenant colonel contacts. He talked, I listened and then carried out his orders. The London Times' report of my liaison duties with Merino in connection with the coup was absolutely false and typified the misinformation and fabricated "facts" that were disseminated to the world regarding the coup in Chile.

The same London Times article ominously reported the presence of the U.S. Navy UNITAS fleet of four ships just outside Chile's international waters on 10 September 1973. True enough. But what the article omitted is more important than what it included. It did not report that the UNITAS fleet's presence in South America was occasioned by an annual joint U.S. - South American training exercise which had been in existence for thirteen years by 1973. More importantly, the article omitted the fact that the fleet's actual location was near the Peruvian port of CALLAO, some three full days steaming from Chile's nearest port city of any consequence in Valparaiso.[24] Hypothetically then, for purposes of influencing events in Chile on 11 September 1973, the Fleet might as well have been in San Diego, California. But this fact of geography was omitted by the experts of innuendo and inference. That the world renowned London Times would print an article filled with such errors of fact and significant omissions is a sad commentary on the state of professional journalism.

As noted previously, some authors rushed to print their versions of the Allende years before the story cooled and expediently sacrificed accuracy for speed. Still others fabricated "facts" to suit their preconceived opinions. Gary MacEoin's book No Peacful Way typifies such self-serving literary efforts.[25] Mr. MacEoin, described on the flyleaf of No Peaceful Way as the "dean of Latin American political analysts," does offer an objective analysis of Chile's economic and political development through 1970. However, his description of the Allende years lacks objectivity, is sympathetic to socialistic/communistic excesses, and twists or creates facts to support his predilections. Mr. MacEoin sweepingly attributes the fall of the Allende regime to the United States in general and the Central Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon, International Telephone and Telegraph, the Green Berets and the U.S. Embassy in Chile in particular.[26] Predicated upon Mr. MacEoin's analysis, one could only surmise that President Allende was along for the ride in Chile and was not the pilot of the ship.

Mr. MacEoin, a naturalized U.S. citizen, of course has every right to his personal political preferences; however, his right to espouse same in an allegedly objective analysis of the Allende years is dubious at best. A few examples of Mr. MacEoin's lack of political objectivity and/or factual errors appears on the following pages of No Peaceful Way. Page 105: MacEoin favorably reports state controlled food distribution without observing that this also leads to vote control.[27] Page 111: MacEoin describes MIR bank robbers as "altruistically motivated."[28] Page 139: MacEoin favorably characterizes the ultra-left wing MIR as modern day "Robinhoods." In contrast, he invariably describes the ultra-right wing Patria Libertad as "fascists." Page 141: MacEoin glowingly describes General Prats "as the universally respected Army Commander-in-Chief."[29] In fact, Prats was long considered an opportunist by his fellow officers and ultimately a buffon and a serious liability by Allende insiders. Page 151: MacEoin misleads his readers by reporting an average annual presence of 48 U.S. military advisors in Chile during the past decade. Omitted is the fact that since 1970, the average has been 16. Page 161: MacEoin apparently sees nothing inappropriate in the wholesale seizure of private property by armed workers on 29 July 1973, at the call of the President of Chile. Page 169: MacEoin creates a U.S. Air Force Base, complete with 29 U.S. aircraft, in the sleepy Argentine city of Mendoza, 100 miles north-east of Santiago. This revelation will come as a great surprise to the United States and Argentina who have no knowledge of the existence of same. Page 170: In just two sentences MacEoin makes three factual errors, which although hardly monumental, are indicative of his inadequate research. The author of this article is described as a U.S. Army officer attached to the U.S. Embassy in Santiago instead of a U.S. Marine officer attached to the U.S. Navy Mission in Valparaiso. Mr. Art Creeter (incorrectly spelled by MacEoin as "Crater"), a naval engineer, is suggestively described as a conspirator in the coup, a great surprise I'm sure to Mr. Creeter. The foregoing comprise just a few of the prejudices and errors of fact that permeate Mr. MacEoin's No Peaceful Way . The discerning, objective reader can find many more.

In summary, Mr. MacEoin's book lacks objectivity and accuracy. The valid criticisms he offers of the Junta Militar are diluted by his very obvious predilections. No Peaceful Way is not the type of literary effort that earned Mr. MacEoin the title "dean of Latin American political analysts." One can only speculate how many readers of this respected author have accepted his every word as fact.

The most slanderous piece of journalism describing Chile's coup was carried in Newsweek's 8 October 1973, edition entitled "Slaughterhouse in Santiago" by John Barnes. Ironically, this defaming article, which pandered to the macabre and sensational, cannot be attributed to a communist conspiracy. The communists are infinitely more subtle and adroit with their exaggerations and fabrications than the heavy-handed Barnes. The Newsweek correspondent vividly described Chileans as a people living in cold terror following the coup. From unattributed sources he conjured reports of, inter alia, "midnight knocks on the door," "headless corpses" and "police machine gunning ten defenseless high school boys in the back." About the only instruments of terror missing from the Barnes' horror story were tiger cages and gas chambers. Despite the Junta's alleged reign of fear and rule by gun, Mr. Barnes reports that "not only once, but twice I was able to penetrate the heavily guarded Santiago morgue" where, according to Barnes, the Junta was disposing of the "2,796 Santiaguinos killed during

the coup." On his second morgue visit the ever resourceful Mr. Barnes alleges he brought a friend , to corroborate his undercover report and a camera to record the scene for posterity. Once inside the morgue, Barnes asks you to believe that he and his friend were allowed to wander about unescorted. Only when he attempts to take a picture did an official ask. "What do you want?" Thinking fast, Barnes replies, "I'm looking for the bathroom." Apparently the reader was expected to believe that the morgue official blithely accepted the Barnes explanation that he was "looking for the bath room" through the lens of a camera. Barnes and friend miraculously terminate their morgue visit by fleeing the building as they are being escorted to the bathroom. Presumably, as in most "fairy tales", they lived happily ever after.

The source for Mr. Barnes' "official morgue body count of 2,796," which he put forth to the world, turned out to be a very unofficial morgue staff member's daughter. The figure of 2,796 corpses was subsequently correctly identified by the New York Times and Wall Street Journal as the sum total of all corpses processed through September 1973. Unfortunately Barnes' incorrect figure has already been reprinted many times around the world and accepted as fact.[30]

Mr. Kenneth Auchinloss, executive editor of Newsweek, casually dismissed Barnes' erroneous body count by stating, "I think it is conceivable there was a misunderstanding." Mr. Auchinloss is too kind both to Mr. Barnes and Newsweek. In such a vital matter, an error of ten or twenty could conceivably be considered a regretable misunderstanding. An error of more than 2000 corpses is gross professional incompetence on the part of author and publisher.[31]

The damage done to Chile's international reputation by Mr. Barnes' article is incalculable. In Europe the article is being used by Communist organizations in paid advertisements to discredit Chile's world image. The figure of "2,796 killed in Santiago alone during the coup" is accepted as gospel in many foreign countries.[32] In the United States, the illustrious Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts dignified Barnes' compilation of professional incompetence and journalistic prostitution by reading same into the Congressional Record. Presumably, Senator Kennedy's foolhardy endorsement of the Barnes' report strongly influenced the subsequent ill-advised U.S. Congressional decision to deny military aid to Chile.

SECOND RATIONALE: HUMAN RIGHTS vs. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The rationale that the full power of the United States' laws and foreign policy should be brought to bear to correct alleged violations of human rights in Chile is a hypocritical morality, in direct conflict with the best interests of the United States. Former Secretary of State William Rogers succinctly and wisely warned against such a policy with these words, "It would be the ultimate arrogance of power to think that we can or should impose our will on others - to threaten or coerce others, even in the name of conscience."[33] Unfortunately, for reasons known only to themselves, some members of our Congress chose to ignore Secretary Rogers' sage counsel.

To demonstrate that our punitive attitude toward Chile is blatantly hypocritical requires only that we review the status of "human rights" in other countries to whom we routinely provide military aid. First and foremost on this list of other recipients is South Korea where the United States has spent billions supporting the dictatorial government of President Park. In addition to our financial support, we currently have 41,000 troops stationed in South Korea. One does not have to be an astute student of inter-

national affairs to observe that, outside of the Communist bloc nations, South Korea is probably the most totalitarian government functioning in the world today. Other examples of our inconsistent policy abound in the Far East. Human rights, as we define them in the United States, do not exist in the Philippine Islands under President Marcos, or in India under Ghandi, but our military aid still flows to those countries without question. For ten years we supported a succession of despots in South Vietnam who probably could not even spell, let alone practice and respect human rights. In the years following the Second World War we poured billions in military aid into Franco's Spain. Did our Congress consider Spain under Franco a bastion for human rights? The list of our military aid recipients whose human rights standards do not conform to those of the United States is endless. Add Greece, Turkey and Thailand just to name a few; there are many others.

Twisting the analogy a bit, one might also ponder our recent wheat sale to Russia, which the Soviets needed much more critically than Chile does our military aid. Did any U.S. congressional delegation visit Moscow to review human rights in Russia prior to approving that dubious sale?

Why has the Congress of the United States singled out Chile as the target for its selective moral indignation? The answer is simply that Chile cannot fight back. Chile presents a convenient target for a cheap shot by our demagogues. Chile does not have the strategic importance of South Korea. It does not have U.S. bases on its sovereign soil as does the Philippine Islands, Turkey and Spain. Like a bully, we have kicked around the smallest kid on the block, because we don't dare take the bigger fellows to task for similar imagined transgressions. We Americans like to claim that we are still the greatest and strongest country in the world. Assuming that to be true, it is inconsistent with our strength and greatness that we pursue a double standard of foreign policy contingent upon a given country's strategic usefulness or ability to counter our actions.

CRITERIA FOR U.S. MILITARY AID

This author most certainly does not suggest that the United States suspend military/economic aid to South Korea, the Philippines or any sovereign country pending our review of the adequacy of human rights in those countries. Such arrogance is not only obsolete, but archaic. The United States is not now, and probably never should have tried to be the policeman of the world. The internal affairs of a sovereign country are just that - INTERNAL - and we must respect them as such. If we do not agree with the internal policies of an ally, perhaps benevolent persuasion would be appropriate. Punitive pressure is most inappropriate and in the final analysis counter productive. The sole criteria for the provision of United States military aid to any country should be: (1) Will the aid provided serve the global strategic interests of the Unites States? (2) Will the aid provided maintain the regional balances of power? The internal affairs of a country, or the politics of its president, as so graphically demonstrated by our pragmatic relationship with Tito's Yugoslavia, are absolutely irrelevant!

STRATEGIC INTERESTS

The United States has specific, clearly definable strategic interests in Chile, a nation which possesses approximately 25% of the world's known copper reserves, as well as other vital minerals. The United States consumes more of such raw materials than it produces. Therefore, as a matter of practical necessity, we need convenient access to such type resources. Chile's 2,600 mile coastline comprises more than half of the West Coast of South America. Valparaiso, Chile, is the largest port on the West Coast of South America.

The biggest and most modern shipyard on the West Coast of South America is located at Talcahuano, Chile. Commercial or military shipping rounding Cape Horn in either direction has a long difficult voyage if it is unwelcome in Chile. That strategic facet will assume greater importance if the United States is successful in giving away the Panama Canal. Chile's Navy and Marine Corps are among the most professional in South America despite generally antiquated ships and the current shortage of equipment. Much of their professional expertise has been gained training at United States military installations during the past three decades. Politics aside, we wisely continued to supply and train these comrades-in-arms even when they officially represented Marxist Chile during the Allende years. Are they of any less value to our strategic interests now as anti-communists? One final note, the portent of which should be clear to all, even to the demagogues in our congress: Chile has extensive holdings in Antarctica; 480,000 miles to be exact. There is oil in Antarctica!

Less clearly definable strategically, but worthy of note, are two philosophical theories. First, Chile defeated communism. How did the United States react? Did we welcome the new government in Chile or offer it generous moral and material support? Were we tolerant and understanding as Chile's military leaders struggled to recover from the disaster of the Allende years? Unfortunately, the answer to all the foregoing questions is negative. What impact then did our negative reaction to Chile's violent overthrow of Communism have on other countries, such as Cuba, which might be considering similar action. Think about it. Secondly, the United States is actively attempting to change the "Big Stick" image that we gained in South America during the Teddy Roosevelt years. Currently we are going through great, although perhaps unwise, machinations over the Panama Canal to prove our sincerity in this regard. Are not our efforts to drown the "Big Stick" image in the Panama Canal inconsistent with our punitive meddling in Chilean internal affairs? Without doubt, the dichotomy of our actions is not lost on the rest of South America.

REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER

When discussing regional balances of power regarding Chile, the discussion is actually of Peru. The formidable Andes divide Chile from Argentina, thereby providing an insurmontable God-given barrier between those two countries. The military capability of Bolivia to the northeast of Chile is so limited that it would only have regional impact if it linked with Peru against Chile or vice versa.

Up until 1971 the balance of power between Peru and Chile was essentially equal. Since 1971 the Peruvians have outspent all their Pacific Coast neighbors in the acquisition of military equipment.[34] Chile, during the same period, fell drastically behind. During the Allende years money was not available to maintain military equilibrium with Peru. Subsequent the Allende Years, the Kennedy Amendment to our Foreign Assistance Act precluded military sales to Chile. Today Peru, primarily as a result of simultaneous acquisitions from both the United States and Russia, has a much greater inventory of military hardware than Chile. Consequently then, the regional balance of power between Chile and Peru is very much out of balance. With support from Russia, a la Angola, Peru could be tempted to regain the territory it lost to Chile during the War of the Pacific. This dangerous imbalance of forces will continue until the Kennedy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act is stricken from the books.[35]

In summary, I propose our Congress take a much more tolerant view of Chile's new government. True, political errors and excesses were committed in the name of expediency. Totally unacceptable? Remember Watergate? True, in the heat of Chile's war against Marxism, human rights were violated.

Totally unacceptable? Remember what we did to our West Coast Japanese, German and Italian citizens during World War II? True, human rights are not all they should be in Chile today, especially if you're a Marxist. Totally unacceptable? Are human rights all they should be in America today, if you're a black in Mississippi? Until the skirts of our Statue of Liberty are immaculately clean, I suggest we not preach to the world, especially from the dubious pulpit of the Congress of the United States

Patrick J. Ryan

Patrick J. Ryan
LtCol USMC

November, 1976

The author,

Lieutenant Colonel Patrick J. Ryan USMC served as a member of the United States Naval Mission to the Republic of Chile during the period December 1972 - April 1976. His monograph "ALLENDE'S CHILE: 1000 BUNGLED DAYS", is predicated upon daily, close-up observations noted during that lengthy tour of duty.

Lieutenant Colonel Ryan, a 1953 graduate of Holy Cross College has 23 years of commissioned Marine Corps service. The highlights of his career include seven varied assignments as a commanding officer and graduation from the Armed Forces Staff College in 1969. An early pioneer in the Marine Corps reconnaissance field, Lieutenant Colonel Ryan is a military qualified parachtist and SCUBA diver. Lieutenant Colonel Ryan was awarded the Legion of Merit, the nation's second highest peacetime award, for his exemplary performance of duty in the Republic of Chile. He is currently assigned to the Fourth Marine Division, Camp Pendleton California, 92055

The Editors



Footnotes

1. Punitive attitude of "Legislative Branch/Congress" is used advisedly in lieu of "government" to distinguish from the Executive and Departments of State/Defense who generally do not endorse a punitive attitude toward Chile.

2. Prior ratifying Allende as president, the congress required he sign a constitutional amendment reaffirming freedom of the press, education, electoral process and the non-involvement of the military in political matters. Allende signed the amendment and was ratified as president by a congressional vote of 135-5.

3. Régis Debray, The Chilean Revolution, Conversations with Allende, New York, Random House, 1971, pp. 119-120.

4. See statement James D. Theberge, Director Latin American Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, before House Subcommittee on Inter American Affairs, 18 September 1974.

5. David Holden, Allende and the Myth Makers, Encounter, Vol. XLII, No 1, January, 1974, London. Also see Mr. Holden's article for excellent analysis of Allende's Presidency and logical dissection of reasons leading to failure of same.

6. Sources of economic statistics: Harold Blakemore, "Chile: Current Realities and Historical Projections", Bank of London and South American Review, London, 15 March, 1975. Foreign Economic Trends, January, 1975. ET 75-002, Chile. Prepared by U.S. Embassy, Santiago, Chile. Released by U.S. Department of Commerce.

7. The Allende government exploited a legal technicality of the 1967 Agrarian Reform Law which permitted the expropriation of "abandoned and badly run farms". The owners of "legally intervened" farms were paid .01% of value of their property in cash and the balance in government bonds. See Gordon Young, "Chile, Republic on a Shoestring, National Geographic, October, 1973, p. 467 for an informative personal report on the efficiency of "intervened farms".

8. "Chile-Process of Social Evolution", Part I, FOCUS, Vol. XXIV, No 8, April 1974.

9. The Chilean Economy Under the Popular Unity Government. Business School of Valparaiso, March, 1974.

10. See David Holden, "Allende and the Myth Makers", Encounter, Vol. XLII, No 1, January, 1974, p. 15, and James Theberge's "Kremlin's Hand in Allende's Chile", Soviet Analyst, London, 15 August, 1974 for an account of USSR-Cuban relations with Chile.

11. Ibid, p. 23 and Gary MacEoin, No Peaceful Way, Sheed & Ward, Inc., New York 1974, Chapter 3 for opposing perspectives of farm interventions.

12. Gary MacEoin, No Peaceful Way, Sheed & Ward, Inc., New York, 1974, pp. 83-84.

13. See statement by Chile's Ambassador to the Organization of American States, Manuel Trucco, 23 October, 1974 for detailed listing of arms shipped to Chile from Cuba.

14. Ibid, p. 94, and Robert Moss, "Chile's Coup and After", Chile: The Balanced View, University of Chile, 1975, p. 53 discuss Cuban financing of guerrilla activities in Chile.

15. Ibid, pp. 85-107, provides a detailed discussion of Chile's "Cuban Connection".

16. Paul E Sigmund, "Allende in Retrospect", Chile: The Balanced View, University of Chile, 1975, p. 33.

17. Daily personal observations of author this article during forty month tour of duty as Marine Corps Advisor, U.S. Navy Section, Chile, commencing December, 1972.

18. Personal conversations with Admiral Sergio Huidobro, Commandant, Chilean Marine Corps.

19. A MIR plan to assassinate 600 key military figures and conservative civilian leaders on 18 September, 1973. Coming on the heels of the mutiny revelation of 7 August, 1973 Plan ZETA was considered a real threat by the Chilean military. See "Chile after Allende; Exonomist, London, 13 October, 1973, p. 47 for discussion of planned naval mutiny and Plan ZETA.

20. Ibid, pp. 44-47.

21. Personal conversation with Admiral Sergio Huidobro, Commandant, Chilean Marine Corps

22. See Paul E Sigmund, "Allende in Retrospect", Chile: The Balanced View, University of Chile, 1975, p. 37 for discussion of various conflicting accounts of Allende's death.

23. See statement Ernest W. Lefever, Senior Fellow Brookings Institute, before subcommittee on Inter American Affairs, House Committee of Foreign Affairs, 5 August, 1974 for comments relative press coverage of Chile's Coup.

24. Like Caesar's wife, the Unitas Fleet, in order to be above even the suspicion of suspicion, turned 180° on 10 September 1973 and steamed for Argentina via the Panama Canal; a circuitous detour of some 9000 miles.

25. Gary MacEoin, No Peaceful Way, Sheed and Ward, Inc., New York, 1974.

26. See Michael J Harrington, "The CIA in Chile: A Question of Responsibility", New York Times, 2 January, 1976, p. 25 for article supporting Mr. MacEoin's analysis of The United States involvement in Chile's Coup.

27. See "Stalemated Revolution", The Economist, London, 10 March 1973, p. 23 for less favorable evaluation of Allende's state controlled food distribution program.

28. Allende amnestied the bank robbers after his election. Subsequently, at least one of the group was involved in the MIR assassination of former Christian Democrat Minister of the Interior Edmundo Perez Zujovic.

29. See Robert Moss, "Chile's Coup and After", Chile: The Balanced View, University of Chile, 1974, p. 49, for contrasting opinion of Prat's character.

30. See Pablo Huneeus, "Those Horror Tales from Chile", Wall Street Journal, 2 November, 1973, (Editorial Page) for additional comments on Barnes' Newsweek article. In same edition see Everet G. Martin, "And a Few Echoes from Academia" for other examples of exaggerated/misleading reports relative the Allende years.

31. Hunneus, OP. cit, (Editorial Page).

32. See Alan Schwartz, "Chile's Orwellion Nightmare Machine", Miami Herald, 21 March, 1976 p. 5-E, as an example of the still lingering impact of Mr. Barnes' erroneous report. Mr. Schwartz states, "25,000 people were exterminated in the weeks following the coup".

33. Statement William Rogers, quoted Washington Post, 25 August, 1972.

34. Report Washington Post, 10 January, 1975, p. A-6. See also "Peru, Military Build-up Worries Neighbors", Aviation Week, 2 December, 1974.

35. See Ernest W. Lefever, "Prospects for United States-Chile Relations", Chile: The Balanced View, The University of Chile, 1974, pp. 273-274 for further discussion of regional military balance between Chile and Peru.

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Admiral JOSE TORIBIO MERINO committed the Chilean Navy to Operation COCHAYUYO (Seaweed) on 8 Sep 73 and in so doing altered Chile's history.



Admiral Sergio Huidobro, Chilean Marine Commandant was entrusted with the vital mission of obtaining Army and Air Force total concurrence in Operation COCHAYUYO. The success of COCHAYUYO required the armed forces function as an entity. Indecision, delay or non-concurrence could trigger civil war. Generals Pinochet and Leigh concurred on 9 September 1973.



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